Landing at Inchon

Landing at Inchon Foolish Risk or calculated Gamble? Campaign Analysis Operation CHROMITE The Ultimate Ch wholeenge for the blood force officer is deciding on where and when to commit forces to best leverage available flake power against the opp wholenessnessnt. full general Douglas MacArthur has been criticized for his decision, even though it succeeded, to make the invasion of Korea at the harbor of Inchon. This paper explores the legitimacy of that decision based on the principles of array power. A popular army aphorism is that profit has a super C fathers, period defeat is an orphan.The American invasion of Inchon during the Korean struggle must certainly be the exception to this. General Douglas MacArthur, loved by some, hate by others, right enoughy deserves all of the credit for much(prenominal) a boldface and audacious decision. In retrospect, his decision deserves perhaps a bit more than(prenominal) circumspection. If Inchon had failed, whether tactically or strategicalally, non scarce could the state of wars number have been different, solely most certainly MacArthur would have been lambasted in his own clip, as well as our own by arm result theorists and generals.Was his decision soundly based in military principles, balanced by final stages to means? Or was it a gamblers destruction shut away of the dice? Americas war aims at the onset of the Korean War were simple Drive the due labor union Korean Peoples soldiers (NKPA) out of South Korea, back across the 38 th parallel and re- sustain peace on American terms. These were the explicit aims. The strategic priorities allow for sound strikingly well-known(prenominal) to those familiar with strategic debate in this era of Bosnia, Somalia, Haiti and Operation Desert Storm End the war as quickly as possible and keep U. S. casualties to a minimum.Even in the 1950s, in that location was a policy-making drive to keep wars short and bloodless to meet national ends without e xpending resources. Perhaps the national tendency to hope to impress something for nothing is a fundamental characteristic of America. For the join Koreans, the opposite was true. Kim Il Sungs aim was to reunify the two Koreas. Since he could not accomplish this governmentally, he resorted to military means to gain a policy-making end. He had committed northernmost Koreas limited resources and manpower perfectly and completely to the reunification of the Korean peninsula.Kim Il Sung may not have realized it, but he had two possible branches of strategic priorities. The first was to drive the Americans out of the Pusan Perimeter and back to japan, thus allowing him time to consolidate his hold politically, socially and militarily on Korea. The second branch, out-of-the-way(prenominal) more subtle, would have been to keep the Americans bottled up at Pusan and continue to attrit American lives, while consolidating his hold and streng thereforeing his long logistical tail. By v iolent death Americans, North Korea could make victory appear extremely costly to the American government and perhaps wear heap the political will to fight.The political will to fight would be backed up by how the American military would actually conduct the fight. American doctrine has historically been inclose by the notion of preparing to fight the beside war as the last one was fought. go this type of doctrinal thinking came back to stalk the U. S. in Vietnam strangely enough, it was the correct approach for Korea. The American military had of course, only just finished fighting domain War Two quint years prior to North Koreas invasion of South Korea. While the U. S. orce structure had been dramatically drawn down and was unprepared to fight the next war, its doctrinal approach to waging war had not changed. American doctrine during the introductory war was offensively oriented, relying primarily on the foundation to hold give away terrain at one time the enemy had be en pushed off. The rubbing of enemy forces was secondary to seizing and reason landed estate. Offensive action was used to envelop a foes flank, without resorting to frontal encroachments. Armors role was to gain the initiative to each one with an envelopment or a penetration at a wearied point in the enemys front.Tanks were regarded as the best ordnance to kill other tank. The doctrinal use of triggerman and close bank line condense made broad strides during World War Two. By the end of that war, the U. S. legions was real good at conducting offensive war, largely because they did not have to defend their own homeland as the German Army had been forced to do. However, American defensive doctrine was weaker. Reliance on beef up strongpoints made penetration of American lines halcyon, as the 1 st Armored discussion section discovered to its regret during the opening phase of the Kasserine Pass battles.A strongpoint defense with expeditious accoutermentsed counter attack forces might work against an attacking tank persona, but it was ill-equipped to deal with an infiltrating infantry force which attacked at night, bypassing the strongpoint and raided logistical bases. On the whole, the experience of the previous World Wars had molded the American commanders methods of waging combat. General Douglas MacArthur had been a regimental commander during World War One and an Army commander during World War Two. During both of his previous experiences, he had relied on boldness, assurance and the offensive to gain and maintain the initiative over his opponents.MacArthurs brilliant use of amphibious operations in the peaceable against the Japanese had already provided him with the experience necessary to decide on an amphibious landing at Inchon, far nates enemy lines, to cut off the North Korean logistical lines of communication and quickly re begin the great of South Korea, Seoul. As the American doctrinal approach to the operation was the same as in the previous conflict, so essentially were the forces at MacArthurs disposal The U. S. Army force structure was centered on the pre-eminence of the infantry divisions, with integrated armor strengthener.An infantry division had three regiments, with three battalions each, and four infantry companies per battalion. The division also had one tank battalion, parceling one company of M-24s (outgunned in comparison to the Russian made T-34 which the North Koreans used) to each regiment. During the drawdown which borrowed World War Two, the number of infantry battalions per regiment was reduced by one. The infantrymens armoury largely consisted of small arms, mortars and heavy machine guns. However, the infantry had no in truth effective anti-tank weapon. The standard issue 2. 36 inch rocket was no match for the thick armor of the T-34.The three division artillery battalions (one per infantry regiment) had also suffered cutbacks, dropping from three batteries each to two. With this structure, the X army corps, commanded by study General Almond, was established to conduct the amphibious assault at Inchon. X Corps consisted of the 1st shipboard soldier Division, plus one regiment pull back from the Pusan Perimeter in stage to bring that Division to a full wartime strength of three regiments, and the 7th Infantry Division. While X Corps was the assault force, overall command and joint support was under the comprehensive control of Joint Task Force (JTF) 7, with seven subordinate parturiency forces.JTF-7 was a true joint operational command, incorporating Navy, Army and Marine units in order to support the assault force. JTF-7 would strike the North Koreans at a weak, unprepared point, effecting surprise and mass before the North Koreans could react. North Korean military doctrine virtually resembled the Chinese model. Mao Tse Tungs approach was to avoid strong points and infiltrate an enemys lines to expunge the weakly defended rear orbital cavitys, in order to destroy racy logistical areas. The North Koreans were not as road bound as the American army was, which gave them more flexibility than the Americans.North Korean equipment was largely Russian and Chinese made, including the awesome Russian T-34. The North Korean force structure most resembled the Chinese and Soviet triangular formation. On the offense, the two up and one back method was used. On the defense, this formation was reversed. The infantry divisions main body was usually preceded by four tank battalions, whose behind area was to punch through an opponents main defenses and continue on into the rear areas, leaving the infantry to mop up.While sorely overlooking in mail support with only nineteen outdated Soviet aircraft and almost no dark blue to speak of, the North Koreans did possess the T-34 tank and towed artillery. In the Inchon/Seoul area, the 3 d, 10 th and 13 th Divisions were astride the Seoul-Taejon-Taegu highway, within easy striking range o f the landing areas. Some 400 soldiers of the 3 d Bn, 226 th Independent Marine control and elements of the 918 th Artillery control defended Wolmi-do Island, the invasions initial neutral. North Korean shore artillery consisted of 75mm guns inside concrete revetments. Operation CHROMITE succeeded for several reasons.First, the U. S. (with British assistance) was able to establish and maintain air supremacy strike aircraft were able to scud North Korean units during daylight hours and attrit units in the Seoul-Inchon area. Control of the skies permitted the isolation of the invasion area and keep oned reinforcing units from reaching the invasion area. Control of the sea permitted the logistical support of the assault force without fear of interruption by enemy surface or submarine forces. The presence of a secure logistical base on Japan ensured a smooth flow of supplies, both to units at Inchon as well as Pusan.With marine gunfire support, the Americans also pounded defensive authoritys on Wolmi-do Island with high explosives and napalm, effectively neutralizing the North Koreans. Securing the island was absolutely critical to success of the operation, because without it, the North Koreans could enfilade the invading amphibious forces with artillery and small arms fire. The capture of key terrain at Inchon, specifically Cemetery and Observatory Hills was also all-important(a) in ensuring that X Corps would have a secure beachhead. clutch the high ground east of Inchon at Yongdungpo and Sosa gave the American the payoff of holding key terrain rom which to continue their operations to the east. The capture of Kimpo battlefield on the morning of 18 September facilitated the staging of Marine Corsairs loyal Close childs play Support boots for the Marines on the ground. Further, small unit actions, such as the capture of the causeway linking Wolmi-do with Inchon illustrate the value of highly trained, motivated, veteran soldiers as a combat multipl ier. In retrospect, the preconditions for victory were already and in place and the outcome of foregone conclusion the combination of U. S. naval and air supremacy seem to have guaranteed it.However, the most critical action was Douglas MacArthurs adept minded determination to land X Corps at Inchon instead of the location preferred by the Joint Chiefs, Kunsan, 100 air miles in the south of Inchon. MacArthur had other options, besides Kunsan, which all seemed more prudent, but he stuck to his guns. Indeed, if he had exclusively introduced more troop into the Pusan Perimeter, or had made the envelopment more shallow, he would not have ended up with the results he achieved Namely, a complete disruption of the North Korean LOCs and the recapture of Seoul.Instead of simply pushing the North Koreans back or pushing from another side, CHROMITE was intentional to completely unhinge the North Koreans and throw them off balance by hitting them from the rear. Only MacArthurs decision ens ured a quick victory without resorting to a slow, bloody series of battles back north up the Korean peninsula, which would have allowed the North Koreans to retreat along their supply lines. The smashing success of CHROMITE, followed by the recapture of Seoul, coupled with the breakout from the Pusan Perimeter by the 8th Army, helped the Americans accomplish their principle war aim.The North Koreans were unable to disengage from the American Eight Army units in front of them and reinforce the invasion area. As part of their force was held by Eighth Army, even while withdrawing, North Korean rear area support units were devastated by X Corps. MacArthurs hammer and anvil technique ensured the virtual collapse of the North Korean army. While the Americans gained their endeavors, the North Koreans nearly lost everything. In their gamble, they had committed all of their resources, stretching themselves thinly, only to have their logistical tail cut behind them.They retreated rapidly ba ck across the 38 th Parallel, closely pursued by American and ROK units. MacArthurs decision to land at Inchon, instead of further to the south as the Joint Chiefs would have preferred, was not only in accordance with the classic fundamentals of war, but more subtly, closely adhered to Clausewitzs approach. MacArthur realized that he had to make a political statement as well as conduct a military operation. The psychological effect of quickly recapturing the South Korean national capital sent a very strong statement to the rest of the Pacific rim, including China and Russia.CHROMITE was shrewdly designed to signal that America stood by her ally and would come through in a crisis. MacArthurs adherence to the principles of war is a model for future similar operations OBJECTIVE General MacArthur chose Inchon as the landing site for the amphibious operation primarily because of its law of proximity to Seoul, the capital of South Korea. Inchon, located on the west coast of the Korean pe ninsula, is eighteen miles west of Seoul. MacArthur saw the recapture of Seoul as vital for winning the support of the United Nations and for putting fire into the motivation of the assort Asian countries.Inchon was thus not only a military objective but a political one. OFFENSIVE MacArthur saw Operation CHROMITE as the means towards taking the initiative away from the North Koreans. CHROMITE would place the allied forces on the offensive and gain the decisive momentum required to prevent the war from stagnating and becoming a long, drawn out war of attrition which MacArthur, a veteran of World War One was already familiar with. MASS The invasion force, X Corps, consisted of 70,000 troops. Intelligence estimates put the NKPA strength in the Inchon-Seoul area at 8,000 soldiers, of whom 1,800-2,500 were garrisoned in the landing area.This was later confirmed by POWs who stated that the Inchon garrison numbered 2,000. The U. S. Eighth Army, in the Pusan perimeter, was occupying the a ttention of the NKPA in the south and would keep the North Koreans busy in that sector. ECONOMY OF FORCE MacArthur legitimate one Marine regiment out of the Pusan perimeter in order to beef up the 1 st Marine Division, X Corps. This was a great risk, but the 1 st Division commander, major(ip) General Oliver Smith, did not tone of voice that he would be able to accomplish the landings without the regiment.When MacArthur reviewed the risk of pulling one regiment out of Pusan, he reasoned that once the landings were successful, the NKPA would withdraw north to counterattack, thus taking pressure off Eighth Army. MANEUVER The Americans had the advantage of interior lines at the Pusan perimeter, but were free to exploit exterior lines because of the lack of an opposing naval force. The North Koreans were strung out all along the Korean peninsula with long LOCs. The NKPA was also at a disadvantage because of their terrain generate flanks the Korean coastline.CHROMITE was designed to be a flank attack with the goal of attacking deep in the enemys rear, disrupting his LOCs and cutting off the main forces highroad of retreat. UNITY OF COMMAND General MacArthur activated X Corps, appointing his Chief of Staff, Major General Edward Almond, as the commander. This was more critical than it appears on the surface because of the very multi-service nature of the Corps. With one Marine Division and one Army Division, a lesser commander might have decided to let each Division commander have his own area, without a single co-ordinated command and staff structure.MacArthurs creation of X Corps for a single mission ensured that he could pick a commander who would follow his guidance to the letter, ensuring mission success, without squabbling over seniority and interservice rivalries. X Corps sole mission was the Inchon landings and the subsequent capture of Seoul. General Almond understood this, and also knew that once the landings were completed, he was to return to Japan an d continue his duties as the Far eastmost look out on CofS. SECURITY MacArthur realized that operational security of Operation CHROMITE was of unproblematic importance to the success of the landings.Surprise could not be achieved unless the enemy was caught wholly unprepared. to a lower place a cloak of secrecy, X Corps staged out of Yokohoma and Kobe Japan behind a perfect natural screen, Typhoon June and in front of another one, Typhoon Kezia. SURPRISE This was achieved partly because of negligible North Korean air and naval capability to gather newsworthiness on American troop movements. Also, Inchon was not considered the best location for an amphibious assault, by anyone, North Korean or American. Inchon has no beaches, only mud flats. There is also a flagitious heave problem, with a tidal variance of -. feet at low tide and 32 feet at high tide. However, CHROMITE was a complete success. The assault troops encountered only spotty resistance and friendly casualties were m uch lighter than expected. inside 24 hours of the main landings, the 1 st Marine Division had secured the high ground six miles east of Inchon. SIMPLICITY CHROMITE was designed to be a single envelopment. X Corps made the amphibious assault at Inchon while the Eighth Army broke out of the Pusan perimeter to tie down and hold the NKPA in place. This prevented the North Koreans from reinforcing their rear areas.The Eighth Army was then to drive north, pushing the logistically cut off NKPA back north, where the Americans would link up with the landing force at Seoul. CHRONOLOGY OF OPERATION CHROMITE 4 July- Planning league chaired by MacArthur, who proposes an amphibious assault designed to cut the North Korean Lines of Communication (LOC) at Seoul. 12 August- CINCFE Operation 100-B issued naming Inchon as the target area for the assault. 23 August- Planning conference in Washington, during which MacArthur convincingly presents his grammatical case for the assault at Inchon. 6 August - General Order 24 is issued spark off X Corps, naming Major General Almond as the commander. 28 August- The Joint Chiefs concur in principle with MacArthurs plan. 31 August- Lt. Eugene Clark begins his intelligence collection mission at Yonghung-do. 3 September- JTF 7 OPLAN 9-50 issued. 4 September- Air attacks begin against North Korean forces in the Seoul-Inchon area. MacArthur places the 1 st Marine brigade under X Corps. 6 September- MacArthur confirms earlier orders and announces that D-Day will be 15 September. 11 September- X Corps units, the 1 st Marine Division and 7 th Infantry Division depart from ports in Japan. 3-14 September- The U. S. Navys Gunfire Support group arrives off Inchon and begins the bombardment of Wolmi-do Island with air support provided by TF 77. 15 September- D-Day- X Corps arrives at Inchon. 0500 Air strikes hit Wolmi-do Island. 0630 High tide in Inchon harbor. 0633 3 d Bn, 5 th Marines land at Wolmi-do Island. 0750 Wolmi-do is secured. 1730 High ti de in Inchon harbor. 1732 1 st Marine Regiment lands at Blue Beach, Inchon. 1733 5 th Marine Regiment lands at Red Beach, Inchon. 16 September- D+1 7 th Infantry Division begins arriving at Inchon harbor. 130 Initial D-Day objectives secured. 18-19 September 7 th Infantry Division lands and moves south of Inchon into a blocking position to protect the beachhead from counterattacks from the south. BIBLIOGRAPHY Appleman, Roy E. South to the Naktong, North to the Yalu (June-November 1950). The U. S. Army in World War II. Washington, DC Office of the Chief of Military History, Department of the Army, 1961. Doughty, Robert A. The development of U. S. Army Tactical Doctrine, 1946-76. Leavenworth Papers No. 1. Ft. Leavenworth, KS Combat Studies Institute, U. S. Army Command and General Staff College.